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Abstract
This paper characterized optimal fiscal policy - with environmental taxes, and public
spending on abatement - in the presence of pollution, and evaluated it relative to the
exogenous (observed) one in Bulgaria, an economy with a largely unreformed and pol-
luting industry. The results are evaluated in light of the optimal environmental taxation
of dirty production and the optimal spending on abatement, and the effect of those
fiscal measures on the utility-enhancing environmental quality. To this end, a dynamic
general-equilibrium model is calibrated to Bulgarian data (1999-2016). The main find-
ings from the computational experiments performed are: (i) The optimal steady-state
income tax rate is zero; (ii) The benevolent Ramsey planner provides twenty percent
higher utility- enhancing environmental quality; (iii) The optimal level of carbon taxes
is almost three times higher, and the optimal level of abatement spending is six times
higher; (iv) The optimal steady-state consumption tax is twice lower.
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1 Introduction and Motivation
Since the early 1990s, many macroeconomic studies have focused on the effects of observed
fiscal policy in general equilibrium setups, and in particular comparing and contrasting it
to a benchmark-, or ”optimal fiscal policy” regime.1 The exercise was used to inform pol-
icymakers about the taxation and spending mix in public finances, and how it needs to be
adjusted to improve allocative efficiency in the economy. The main focus of the compu-
tational experiments performed in those papers, however, has been predominantly on the
effects of government purchases (consumption), public investment, and capital and labor
taxes. One limitation of that literature is that it overemphasized the distinction between
capital and labor income taxation, and abstracted away from consumption, or value-added,
taxation (VAT). Furthermore, in Eastern Europe, there was also a move toward a common
income tax rate,and reliance on indirect (consumption/VAT and excise) taxation. Such char-
acteristics lead to a slightly different public finance problem, from the ones typically covered
in the public finance literature. In particular, in addition to deciding on the optimal level of
public spending, here the fiscal authority is also choosing two tax rates - a common income
tax rate, and a tax rate on consumption.
Recently, there has been an intense discussion of environmental policy within the macroe-
conomic context, e.g. Fischer and Heutel (2013). The focus of this paper is the particular
effects of this ”environmental fiscal policy” within the paradigm of public finance macroeco-
nomics. A suitable case study for the aggregate effects of environmental policies is Bulgaria,
a former communist country, and a current EU member state. We will focus on the period
after the introduction of the currency board arrangement (1999-2016), which is a period of
macroeconomic stability. One aspect of the communist heritage was the over-reliance on
heavy manufacturing, and the disregard of environmental norms. In particular, the energy-
intensive industry was a major polluter of the environment. Often pollution is a negative
externality of industrial production, as producers often do not take it under consideration
when choosing their output levels. Such external effects then necessitate government ac-
tion to improve allocative efficiency through taxes and spending. The public finance setup,
augmented with environmental fiscal policy, is an important variation from the classical
1For, example, Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994, 1999), and many others.
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approach described in Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994, 1999), and thus represents an
important contribution to the literature, which could be of interest to policy-makers.
The paper then proceeds to characterize optimal (Ramsey) fiscal policy in the context of
the problem described above and then to evaluate it relative to the exogenous (observed)
fiscal policy regime. Similar to earlier literature, e.g. Judd (1985), Chamley (1986), and Zhu
(1992), allowing distortionary taxation in a dynamic general-equilibrium framework creates
interesting trade-offs: On the one hand, utility-enhancing environmental quality directly
increase household’s utility. On the other, the proportional income taxes and the environ-
mental tax levied on production will negatively affect the incentives to supply labor and to
accumulate physical capital. In turn, higher taxes reduce not only income, but also consump-
tion, which is actually hit twice due to a second round of taxation, this time at the point of
consumption. Both types of distortionary taxes lower welfare, both directly, and indirectly,
by generating less tax revenue which could be spent on public abatement spending, which
would increase the utility-enhancing environmental quality.
The optimal fiscal policy problem discussed in this paper is to choose consumption tax
rate, a common income tax rate, an environmental tax rate to finance public spending on
abatement and redistributive government transfers, while at the same time minimizing both
the allocative distortions created in the economy, as a result of the presence of proportional
taxation, and the pollution externality, which lowers the level of utility-enhancing environ-
mental quality. The main findings from the computational experiments performed are: (i)
The optimal steady-state income tax rate is zero; (ii) The benevolent Ramsey planner pro-
vides twenty percent higher utility-enhancing environmental quality; (iii) The optimal level
of carbon taxes is almost three times higher, and the optimal level of abatement spending is
six times higher; (iv) The optimal steady-state consumption tax is twice lower, as compared
to the exogenous policy case.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model framework
and defines the decentralized equilibrium system. Section 3 discusses the calibration pro-
cedure, and Section 4 presents the steady-state model solution. Sections 5 proceeds with
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the optimal taxation (Ramsey) policy problem, and evaluates the long-run effects on the
economy. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Model Description
The model setup follows closely Vasilev (2018b). In particular, there is a representative
household in the model economy, which derives utility out of consumption, leisure and en-
vironmental quality. On the production side, there is a stand-in firm, which produces a
homogeneous final good, and pollution as a by-product, which in turn lowers the level of
environmental quality. The government imposes a carbon tax on output, and in addition can
spend on pollution abatement activities. The government also has access to consumption
and income taxation, and returns the surplus revenue back to the household in a lump-sum
fashion. The final good which could be used for consumption, investment, or government
pollution abatement spending.
2.1 Household
The representative one-member household values consumption, leisure, and environmental
quality:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ln ct + θ ln(1− ht) + γ ln qt
}
, (2.1)
where E0 is the expectations operator as of period 0, 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor, ct
denotes household’s consumption in period t, ht denote hours worked, and qt is preference
for clean environment (”environment quality”). Parameter θ > 0 reflects the relative (to
consumption) weight attached to leisure, while γ > 0 denotes the relative weight that the
household attaches to environment quality. As in in Angelopoulos et al. (2013), we define
the last term as a ”good” (or absence of pollution, hence ”more is better”), and not as a
”bad” (stock of pollution). This is done to preserve the positive monotonicity in household’s
preferences. In addition, environmental quality will possess all the features of a public good.
The household starts with an initial stock of physical capital k0 > 0, and has to decide
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how much to add to it in the form of new investment. Every period physical capital depre-
ciates at a rate δk, where 0 < δk < 1. The law of motion for physical capital is then
kt+1 = it + (1− δk)kt, (2.2)
and the real interest rate is rt, hence the before-tax capital income of household i in period
t equals rtkt. The household also owns the firm in the economy, and has a legal claim on the
firm’s profit, πt. In addition to capital income, each household can generate labor income by
working in the representative firm. The hourly wage rate is wt, so before-tax labor income
equals wtht. The household’s budget constraint is as follows:
(1 + τ ct )ct + kt+1 − (1− δk)kt = (1− τ
y
t )[wtht + rtkt + πt] + g
t
t, (2.3)
where τ ct is the consumption tax rate, τ
y
t is the common (labor and capital) income tax rate,
and gtt denotes government lump-sum transfers.
The household takes initial capital stock k0, environmental quality {qt}∞t=0, prices {wt, rt}∞t=0,
profits {πt}∞t=0, and policy variables {τ ct , τ
y
t , g
t
t}∞t=0 as given, and chooses {ct, ht, kt+1}∞t=0 to
maximize Eq. (2.1) s.t (2.2)-(2.3). The first-order optimality conditions (FOCs), and the
boundary (transversality) condition for physical capital, are as follows:
ct :
1
ct
= λt, (2.4)
ht :
θ
1− ht
= λt(1− τ yt )wt (2.5)
kt+1 : λt = βEtλt+1[1 + (1− τ yt+1)rt+1 − δk] (2.6)
TV C : lim
t→∞
βtλtkt+1 = 0. (2.7)
The interpretation of the conditions above is standard; The first FOC equates the marginal
benefit from an additional unit of consumption and the shadow price of wealth. The second
equation balances the disutility of labor and the benefit in terms of after-tax wage, and
weighted by the price in terms of consumption. The third one is a dynamic optimality
condition, which states how capital should be allocated in any two congruent periods. The
last one is a boundary condition, imposed to rule out explosive solution paths.
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2.2 Stand-in firm
There is a representative firm in the economy, which produces a homogeneous product. Total
production value is taxed at a rate τEt . The price of output is normalized to unity. The
production technology is Cobb-Douglas and uses both physical capital and labor hours to
maximize static profit
πt = (1− τEt )Akαt h1−αt − rtkt − wtht, (2.8)
where A denotes the level of technology, and τE denotes the time-varying proportional
environmental tax on revenue. In equilibrium, profit is zero (πt = 0), and each input is
priced according to its tax-adjusted marginal product, i.e.:
kt : rt = (1− τEt )α
yt
kt
, (2.9)
ht : wt = (1− τEt )(1− α)
yt
ht
. (2.10)
The carbon/energy tax acts like a tax on inputs, and in many aspects similar to an income
tax, but born by producer (like a payroll tax).
2.3 Pollution and environmental quality
In this paper, the stock of environmental quality is equivalent to ”absence of pollution.”
As in Angelopoulos et al. (2013), and Economides and Phillipopulos (2007), environmental
quality evolves according to the following law of motion:
qt+1 = (1− δq)q̄ + δqqt − pt + νgEt (2.11)
where q̄ > 0 denotes the steady-state stock of environmental quality, 0 < δq < 1 is the
persistence parameter of environment quality. pt denotes the level of emitted pollution in
period t, which decreases environmental quality. To offset the effect of pollution, govern-
ment can spend resources on pollution abatement (cleanup policy), and the efficiency of that
technology is captured by parameter ν > 0.
In the model, pollution pt is generated as a by-product of production, or, in other words:
pt = φyt = φAk
α
t h
1−α
t , (2.12)
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where 0 < φ < 1 is the measure of the pollution technology that maps (say CO2) emissions
as a function of aggregate output. Note that when we solve for the decentralized competitive
equilibrium, the firm will maximize profit independently of the level of pollution emitted,
and would produce a level of output that is larger than the socially optimal amount. In that
sense, there will be a negative externality effect in the competitive equilibrium in the model,
and the allocations will be inefficient.
2.4 Government
In the model setup, the government is levying taxes on labor and capital income, taxes
production, as well consumption in order to its finance spending on transfers and pollution-
decreasing (abatement) activities. The government budget constraint is as follows:
gtt + g
E
t = τ
c
t c+ τ
E
t y + τ
y
t [wtht + rtkt] (2.13)
Government spending on abatement-to-output ratio would be chosen to match the average
share in data, and government transfers would be determined residually in each period so
that the government budget is always balanced.2
2.5 Dynamic Competitive Equilibrium (DCE)
For the given values of the technology parameters {A, φ}, average tax rates {τ c, τ y, τE},
initial capital stock k0, initial environmental quality {q0}, the decentralized dynamic com-
petitive equilibrium is a list of sequences {ct, it, kt, pt, qt, ht}∞t=0 for the household, a sequence
of government purchases and transfers {gtt, gEt }∞t=0, and input prices {wt, rt}∞t=0 such that (i)
the household maximizes its utility function subject to its budget constraint; (ii) the rep-
resentative firm maximizes profit; (iii) government budget is balanced in each period; (iv)
pollution and environmental quality follow their laws of motion; (v) all markets clear.
2From the government constraint it is clear that carbon taxes are an additional burden on labor and
capital income.
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3 Data and Model Calibration
To characterize business cycle fluctuations with pollution and environmental taxation in
Bulgaria, we will focus on the period following the introduction of the currency board (1999-
2016). Quarterly data on output, consumption and investment was collected from National
Statistical Institute (2018), while the real interest rate is taken from Bulgarian National
Bank Statistical Database (2018). The calibration strategy described in this section follows
a long-established tradition in modern macroeconomics: first, as in Vasilev (2016), the dis-
count factor, β = 0.982, is set to match the steady-state capital-to-output ratio in Bulgaria,
k/y = 13.964, in the steady-state Euler equation. The labor share parameter, 1−α = 0.571,
is obtained as in Vasilev (2017b), and equals the average value of labor income in aggregate
output over the period 1999-2016. This value is slightly lower as compared to other studies
on developed economies, due to the overaccumulation of physical capital, which was part
of the ideology of the totalitarian regime, which was in place until 1989. Next, the average
income tax rate was set to τ y = 0.1. This is the average effective tax rate on income between
1999-2007, when Bulgaria used progressive income taxation, and equal to the proportional
income tax rate introduced as of 2008. Similarly, the tax rate on consumption is set to
its value over the period, τ c = 0.2. Carbon tax rate was set to its average effective rate
τE = 0.024, measured as the average tax payment relative to firm’s output value in data,
and spending on abatement is on average gE = 0.01, or one percent of aggregate output
(NSI 2017).
Next, the relative weight attached to the utility out of leisure in the household’s utility
function, θ = 1.243, is calibrated to match that in steady-state consumers would supply one-
third of their time endowment to working. This is in line with the estimates for Bulgaria
(Vasilev 2017a) as well over the period studied. The relative weight attached to environmen-
tal quality, γ = 0.25, which is in line with the weight attached to public goods in Bulgaria
(Vasilev 2018a). Next, the depreciation rate of physical capital in Bulgaria, δk = 0.013, was
taken from Vasilev (2016). It was estimated as the average quarterly depreciation rate over
the period 1999-2014.
The steady-state level of environmental quality, q̄ is normalized to unity, as in Angelopoulos
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et al. (2013). The degree of persistence of environmental quality is also set to a high value,
δq = 0.9, as environmental quality is not just something that pertains to Bulgarian territory.
Next, since we do not have any data on the efficiency of abatement technology, we normalize
ν = 1 as in Economides and Phillipopoulos (2008); In other words the cleaning technology is
identical to the government spending on abatement, which is not a very strong assumption.
Next, for pollution technology, φ = 0.067 was set as the average ratio of carbon dioxide
emissions to output.
Table 1: Model Parameters
Parameter Value Description Method
β 0.982 Discount factor Calibrated
α 0.429 Capital Share Data average
1− α 0.571 Labor Share Calibrated
θ 1.243 Relative weight attached to leisure Calibrated
γ 0.250 Relative weight attached to env. quality Set
δk 0.013 Depreciation rate on physical capital Data average
δq 0.900 Persistence, environmental quality Set
τ y 0.100 Average tax rate on income Data average
τE 0.024 Average tax rate on production Data average
τ c 0.200 VAT/consumption tax rate Data average
A 0.604 Steady-state value of TFP process Calibrated
q 1.000 Steady-state value of env.quality Set
ν 1.000 Efficiency, abatement spending Set
φ 0.067 Steady-state pollution technology Data Average
4 Steady-State
Once the values of model parameters were obtained, the steady-state equilibrium system
solved, the ”big ratios” can be compared to their averages in Bulgarian data. The results
are reported in Table 2 on the next page. The steady-state level of output was normalized
to unity (hence the level of technology A differs from one, which is usually the normalization
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done in other studies), which greatly simplified the computations. Next, the model overes-
timates consumption-to-output, as there is no government consumption in the model. The
investment ratio is also closely approximated, despite the closed-economy assumption. The
shares of income are also identical to those in data, which is an artifact of the assumptions
imposed on functional form of the aggregate production function. The after-tax return,
where r̄ = (1− τ y)r − δ is also relatively well-captured by the model.
Table 2: Data Averages and Long-run Solution
Variable Description Data Model Moment matched
y Steady-state output N/A 1.000 - (normalization)
c/y Consumption-to-output ratio 0.624 0.815 c/y = 1− i
y
− gE
y
i/y Investment-to-output ratio 0.201 0.175 i = δk
y
k/y Capital-to-output ratio 13.96 13.96 avg. k/y in data
gE/y Govt. spending share on abatement 0.010 0.010 avg. gE/y in data
wh/y Labor income-to-output ratio 0.571 0.571 labor share (1− α)
rk/y Capital income-to-output ratio 0.429 0.429 capital share (α)
h Share of time spent working 0.333 0.333 leisure weight (θ)
r̄ After-tax net return on capital 0.014 0.016 discount factor (β)
5 The Ramsey problem (Optimal fiscal policy under
full commitment)
In this section, we solve for the optimal fiscal policy scenario under full commitment and no
externality. More specifically, the government will be modelled as a benevolent planner, who
has the same preferences as the people in the economy, i.e. it will choose to maximize the
household’s utility function, while at the same time taking into account the optimality con-
ditions by both the household and the firm, or the equations describing the DCE.3 The fiscal
3Note that when the household and the firm are making optimal choices, they are taking all fiscal policy
variables as given. Also note that the benevolent government treats everyone the same, i.e., we have already
imposed the symmetry in the constraints.
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instruments at government’s disposal are consumption and income tax rate, carbon tax rate,
and the level of public spending on pollution abatement.4 In this section we allow only for
distortionary, or proportional, taxes, thus the optimal allocations are only ”second-best.”5
In addition, it will be assumed that the government can also fully and credibly commit to
the future sequence of taxes and spending until the end of the optimization period, so the
policy is time-consistent.
Under the Ramsey framework, the choice variables for the government are {ct, gEt , ht, qt, kt+1,
wt, rt}∞t=0 plus the tax rates {τ ct , τ
y
t , τ
E
t }∞t=0. The initial conditions for the state variables
{k0, q0}, the sequence of government transfers {gtt}∞t=0, and the processes followed by total
factor productivity and pollution productivity {At, φt}∞t=0, are all taken as given. The opti-
mal policy problem is then recast as a setup where the government chooses after-tax input
prices r̃t and w̃t directly, where
6
r̃t ≡ (1− τ yt )rt (5.1)
w̃t ≡ (1− τ yt )wt. (5.2)
In addition, the Ramsey planner will be internalizing the pollution externality in the firm’s
profit maximization.
Next, government budget constraint is now represented by
τ ct ct + (1 + τ
E
t )Ak
α
t h
1−α
t − r̃tkt − w̃tht = gEt + gtt (5.3)
The Ramsey problem then becomes
max
{ct,ht,kt+1,gEt ,τEt ,w̃t,r̃t,τct }
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ln ct + θ ln(1− ht) + γ ln qt
}
(5.4)
4Note that the government transfers will be held fixed at the level computed from the equilibrium under
the exogenous policy case.
5In case the government is allowed to use lump-sum taxation, it can achieve the first-best (Pareto)
allocation.
6Note that rt, wt were functions of τ
E
t .
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s.t.
1
ct
= βEt
1
ct+1
[1− δk + r̃t+1] (5.5)
θ
1− ht
=
w̃t
(1 + τ ct )ct
(5.6)
Akαt h
1−α
t = ct + kt+1 − (1− δk)kt + gEt (5.7)
τ ct ct + (1 + τ
E)Akαt h
1−α
t − r̃tkt − w̃tht = gEt + gtt (5.8)
qt+1 = (1− δq)q̄ + δqqt − φAkαt h1−αt + νgEt (5.9)
In order to solve the previous problem we set up the corresponding Lagrangean,
L = max
{ct,ηt,kt+1,gct ,w̃t,r̃t,τct }
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ln ct + θ ln(1− ht) + γ ln qt
+λ1t [−ct+1 + ct(1− δk + r̃t+1)] + λ2t [θ(1 + τ ct )ct − w̃t(1− ht)]
+λ3t [Ak
α
t h
1−α
t − ct − kt+1 + (1− δk)kt − gEt ]
+λ4t [τ
c
t ct + (1 + τ
E
t )Ak
α
t h
1−α
t − r̃tkt − w̃tht − gEt − gtt]
+λ5t [−qt+1 + (1− δq)q̄ + δqqt − φAkαt h1−αt + νgEt ]
}
(5.10)
The optimality conditions are as follows:7
ct : −
λ1t−1
β
+
1
ct
+ λ1t (1− δk + r̃t+1) + λ2t θ(1 + τ ct )− λ3t + λ4t τ ct = 0 (5.11)
ht :
θ
1− ht
+ λ2t w̃t + λ
3
t (1 + τ
E
t )(1− α)
yt
ht
− λ4t w̃t
+λ4t (1 + τ
E
t )(1− α)
yt
ht
− λ5tφ
(1− α)yt
ht
= 0 (5.12)
kt+1 : −
λ3t−1
β
+ λ3t [rt + 1− δ] + λ4t [
(1 + τEt )
1− τEt
rt − r̃t]− λ5tφ
αyt
kt
= 0
gEt : λ
3
t + λ
4
t = νλ
5
t (5.13)
τ ct : λ
2
t θct + λ
4
t ct = 0 (5.14)
r̃t :
λ1t−1ct−1
β
= λ4tkt
qt :
1
qt
+
λ5t−1
β
+ λ5t δ
q = 0. (5.15)
7Note that by choosing capital, hours, and abatement spending, the Ramsey planner chooses environ-
mental quality optimally as well.
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λ1t : ct+1 = ct(1− δk + r̃t+1) (5.16)
λ2t : θ(1 + τ
c
t )ct = w̃t(1− ht) (5.17)
λ3t : Ak
α
t h
1−α
t = ct + kt+1 − (1− δk)kt + gEt (5.18)
λ4t : τ
c
t ct + (1 + τ
E
t )Ak
α
t h
1−α
t = r̃tkt + w̃tht + g
E
t + g
t
t (5.19)
λ5t : qt+1 = (1− δq)q̄ + δqqt − φAkαt h1−αt + νgEt (5.20)
We can also add the equations for the auxiliary variables, namely
yt = Ak
α
t h
1−α
t (5.21)
yt = ct + kt+1 − (1− δk)kt + gEt (5.22)
it = kt+1 − (1− δk)kt (5.23)
rt = (1− τEt )α
yt
kt
(5.24)
wt = (1− τEt )(1− α)
yt
ht
(5.25)
5.1 Steady-state Ramsey with pollution and carbon tax
In this section we focus on the steady-state Ramsey allocations.8 Evaluating optimality con-
ditions and constraints in steady-state produces the following: When the planner internalizes
the pollution externality, carbon tax is set to τE = φ/(1 + φ) to offset the negative effect of
pollution on output. Note that since in steady-state λ
4
β
= λ4[r+ 1− δ], it follows that r = r̃,
which means that τ y = 0. But then it follows that w = w̃, since both factors of production
are taxed at the same rate. Consumption tax rate is again residually determined from the
government budget constraint. In other words, consumption tax revenue needs to equal the
steady-state level of government transfers. Table 3 on the next page reports the results and
compares the observed vs. the optimal fiscal policy regime.
Compared to the exogenous policy case, under optimal fiscal policy the benevolent govern-
ment sets the income tax rate to zero, as in Judd (1985), Chamley (1986), and Zhu (1992),
which leads to a higher capital in steady-state. That drives up after tax wages, and hours
are higher. Steady-state output under the second-best equilibrium is also higher, the same
upward change is observed in investment, and consumption. The real interest rate is also
8IRFs under both regimes identical, focus on steady-state/long-run allocations, analytical results.
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Table 3: Exogenous vs. Ramsey policy
Variable Description Data Exo. policy Ramsey
y Steady-state output N/A 1.000 1.061
c/y Consumption-to-output ratio 0.674 0.815 0.713
i/y Investment-to-output ratio 0.201 0.175 0.224
k/y Capital-to-output ratio 3.491 3.491 4.475
gE/y Government cons-to-output ratio 0.010 0.010 0.063
wh/y Labor income-to-output ratio 0.571 0.571 0.571
rk/y Capital income-to-output ratio 0.429 0.429 0.429
h Share of time spent working 0.333 0.333 0.354
r̃ After-tax net return on capital 0.056 0.057 0.046
q Steady-state environmental quality N/A 1.000 1.200
τE Carbon tax rate 0.024 0.024 0.063
τ y Income tax rate 0.100 0.100 0.000
τ c Consumption tax rate 0.200 0.200 0.098
ξ Welfare gain - 0.000 0.135
lower which is a function of the higher capital stock, which overcompensates for the absence
of income taxation.
The new channel is the pollution channel. Indeed, output is higher under Ramsey, which
could lead to more pollution. With the appropriately chosen carbon tax (which is now three
times higher as compared to the exogenous policy case), and a producer that internalizes the
pollution externality, the net effect on environmental quality is positive, as government now
spends six time more on abatement. In a way, the carbon tax adds to the burden on capital
and labor, and drives down wages and the real interest rate. In essence, what matters in the
model is the total tax burden. Even though the carbon tax is higher, that serves a specific
purpose, to tax pollution at the source, while the ”general-purpose” income tax is abolished,
so the net burden on capital is twice lower.
Finally, note that the only source of revenue is consumption taxation (the revenue from
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the carbon tax is spent on abatement). Since it is a non-distortionary tax, in the Ram-
sey framework its rate will be determined residually to achieve government budget balance.
Since public consumption is now lower, and the level of government transfers is held equal to
its level from the exogenous policy, the consumption tax rate can drop by half to less than
10%. This feeds back into more hours worked, as described above.
Lastly, there is a substantial improvement of welfare that can be realized by moving from the
equilibrium under the exogenous policy regime to the equilibrium with optimal fiscal policy.
The exogenous-policy equilibrium features several inefficiencies driven by the presence of
not only taxes and public goods, but also externalities due to the presence of pollution and
utility-enhancing environmental quality. Welfare gain, measured in terms of additional con-
sumption (ξ), is almost 0.135, which means that in order to make people as well off as they
are under the Ramsey regime, the benevolent government needs to increase the steady-state
consumption under the exogenous policy case by approximately one-seventh to make them
indifferent to the allocation under Ramsey regime. Overall, our results are new and could
be of interest to policy makers, as previous research had ignored the important dimension of
taxing pollution and spending on pollution abatement, and their relevance for fiscal policy,
and economic activity.
6 Conclusions
This paper characterized optimal fiscal policy in the presence of pollution and carbon taxes,
and government spending on pollution abatement, and evaluated it relative to the exogenous
(observed) one. The results were evaluated in light of the optimal taxation of dirty production
and the optimal provision of environment cleaning spending, and the effect of that specific
fiscal policy on the level of utility-enhancing environmental quality. To this end, a dynamic
general-equilibrium model, calibrated to Bulgarian data (1999-2016), was set up with a richer
public finance side. Bulgarian economy was chosen as a case study for a transition economy
with an unreformed and polluting industry. The main findings from the computational
experiments performed in the paper are: (i) The optimal steady-state income tax rate is zero;
(ii) The benevolent Ramsey planner provides the efficient amount of the utility- enhancing
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environmental quality, which are now twenty percent higher; (iii) The optimal level of carbon
taxes is three times higher, and the optimal level of abatement spending is six times higher;
(iv) The optimal steady-state consumption tax is twice lower, as compared to the exogenous
policy case.
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